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Abstract: In this paper, on the basis of the classifica-
tion of the market and customer, we set the basic as-
sumptions of participant in the EC cooperation. We 
take some of the assumptions which were used to 
study grey marketing into the game analysis. And then, 
on the basis of the Hotelling model, we argue the co-
operation strategy choice mechanism between elec-
tronic distributors and traditional distributors in the 
EC cooperation，explore the benefits and costs of all 
parties in the alliance, found that it can bring more 
profit and cost advantage of the alliance is an impor-
tant factor to decide whether or not ally with each 
other. 
Keyword: Buying Risk; Reliability; E-Commerce; 
Cooperation Strategy; Hotelling Model 
 
1. Introduction 
According to the report of CNNIC (China Internet 
Network Information Centre), till 2011, the number of 
internet user in China is more than 500 million and 
amount to 513 million. CN-based registration and the 
number of website amount to 3.53 million and 2.296 
million respectively. As the world’s biggest 
E-commercial market, the enormous amount of in-
ternet surfers in China is the excellent base for 
e-commerce activities. More and more customers 
choose the internet for shopping, among all customers 
in China, E-commerce customer amount to nearly 200 
million. 
With the great development of internet and 
                                                        
Proceedings of the Twelfth International Conference on Elec-
tronic Business, Xi'an, China, October 12-16, 2012, 214-223. 
communication technology, the scale of 
E-commercial transaction increase yearly. 
E-commerce bring with it great economic increase 
and as well E-commerce play more and more impor-
tant role in economic activities. Meanwhile, 
E-commerce inevitably face risks, it challenges tradi-
tional commercial activities, reshape the management 
and operation of enterprise and people’s attitude as 
well. 
The research of E-commerce firstly focuses on 
its concept, mode and model, then the selection of 
applied strategies and application of these strategies. 
Among them, the research of E-commerce strategies, 
particularly the channel strategies, mostly focus on 
the choice between traditional channel and 
E-commerce channel or the integration of multiple 
channels. In accordance with the research of Kumar 
(2006) from the angle of producer’s strategies, he 
studied the reason and mechanism of the addition of 
e-commerce channel to traditional retail channel. 
Chiang (2003) indicates the application of 
e-commercial direct selling channel of suppliers can 
increase the profits of suppliers and decrease dual 
marginalization. Similarly, a lot of researchers sup-
pose customers have a low utility estimation coeffi-
cient for e-commercial product, for instance, 
（Fruchter，2005）. Dumrongsiri A（2008）add 
demand uncertainty to Chiang’s utility function to 
construct random demand function, then by using of 
newsboy model to analyze the effect of demand un-
certainty on producer’s choice of e-commerce direct 
selling and finally indicate a significant relationship 
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between demand uncertainty and e-commerce direct 
selling. Berstein （2008）indicates the necessity of 
application of e-commerce channel in context of oli-
gopoly and further find out the combination of tradi-
tional channel and e-commerce channel can get a ba-
lanced channel structure. Cai G G（2011）researches 
the effect of channel structure on retailers and the 
whole channel. Huang W（2009） researches the 
pricing strategies of single enterprise that based on 
the addition of e-commerce channel to traditional 
channel and indicates mixed channel enterprise will 
take higher price on e-commerce channel to confront 
new enter enterprise. Khouja M （2010）subdivided 
customers into customers only consume in traditional 
channel and compound customers, and research the 
selection and coordination of three channels, namely, 
producer owned retailing channel, direct selling 
channel, and independent channel. Cao W（2010） 
studied channel decision problem in context of de-
mand uncertainty by using of game theory and get the 
balanced channel structure. 
According to above researches, in most situa-
tions, the application of e-commerce channel no mat-
ter for suppliers or retailers, go without saying will 
have a positive effect on the increase of competitive 
advantage.  
Modern enterprise’s success lies on a new coop-
erative relation evolved from antagonism and compe-
tition , sometimes we call it strategic alliance (Maloni 
and Benton，1997). Cooperation relation is a kind of 
quantization commercial relation build on trust, 
openness, risk sharing and benefit sharing. Coopera-
tion relation will bring more commercial benefits to 
partners than without such relation (Lambert, Em-
melhainz & Gardner, 1996, 1999, 2004, 2006, 2008).  
The research of this paper focus on whether or 
not the traditional distributors will cooperate or ally 
with e-commerce distributors when trying to enter 
e-commercial market or build self-owned 
e-commercial distribution channel. 
Whether in traditional commercial mode or 
e-commercial mode, due to different customer prefe-
rence, customers will balance various preference and 
conflict. For instance, customer probably prefer high 
quality, low price product, actually, high quality 
product is always product of high price, so customer 
need to balance product quality and price they can 
pay. In e-commerce situation, customer preference 
may change due to the new transaction situation. For 
instance, when do online transaction, how can seller 
optimize online customer’s concerned efficiency, low 
price, risks to attract more online purchasers is of 
vital importance for formulation of e-commercial 
strategies. 
The author will subdivide the selling channel 
and customers in the second part and provide the ba-
sic hypothesis. 
The third part of this paper will present the me-
chanism for formulation of cooperation strategies 
between traditional distributors and e-commerce dis-
tributors on the basis of hotelling model.  
 
2. Market segmentation and basic Settings 
With the increasing uncertainty and personalization of 
consumer demands, e-commerce markets are increa-
singly competitive. Consumers have risk preferences 
rather than rationality when they make decisions about 
buying goods or services. With different risk prefe-
rences and consumption strategies, consumers have 
different purchasing behaviors, and purchasing beha-
viors determine e-commerce strategies of companies. 
Previous researchers, such as Smith Wendell 
(1956), Suzanne Donner (1992), Marcus, Claudio 
(1998), Verhoef PC and Donkers B (2001), Stanislav 
D. Dobrev (2007), Silvia Sonderegger (2011), and 
Feng Zhu and Marco Iansit (2012), have classified 
markets and consumers from different angles. This 
paper focuses on the distributor cooperation in the 
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e-commerce environment. Online shoppers enjoy 
lower price and higher efficiency brought by network 
channels, but they also face higher risks, such as 
fakes, discrepancies between expectation and reality, 
risks of payment, and price frauds. In contrast, tradi-
tional sales have lower risks in spite of higher prices. 
Therefore, this paper classifies consumers into two 
types based on their risk preferences: one prefers to 
spend more money and insists on traditional sales for 
security, and the other one likes the highly-efficient 
and less-expensive e-shopping. 
In this study, we examine the alliance composed 
by traditional and electronic distributors. Assume that 
the traditional distributor can obtain a certain product 
with price advantage and sells it in traditional markets, 
while the electronic distributor only has the advan-
tage of selling the product on the internet. In this case, 
the two types of consumers may change their choices. 
The former may become online shoppers because the 
electronic distributor joints in the alliance; and the 
latter may purchase from the traditional distributor 
for the similar reason. 
Assume that the traditional distributor T and the 
electronic distributor E sell the same product and they 
build an independent alliance J (e.g.: a joint distribu-
tor), and prices of the product sold by T, E, and J are 
PT, PE, and PJ, respectively. Obviously, the price 
relationship is as follows: . 
To control other conditions, this paper supposes 
that products sold by both distributors are exactly the 
same without structural or functional difference and 
differences between traditional and e-commerce dis-
tributors are risks and prices during the purchase 
process. In this paper, the reliability of purchasing 
goods is set to R, which varies in different channels. 
The behavior of purchasing goods at a higher price 
through traditional distributors reflects that these 
consumers prefer to pursue reliability at a higher cost, 
lowering purchase risks; the behavior of purchasing 
goods at a lower price through the network reflects 
that these consumers are risk-takers who prefer to 
save more money. Therefore, the former buyers are 
considered as the "risk avoidance" type, and the latter 
is the "risk preference" type (or less risk avoidance). 
Here are the questions to be explored. Will tradi-
tional distributors ally with e-commerce distributors 
when they enter into the e-commerce market? If yes, 
what are consequences (consumer position and 
chances of survival in the alliance)? 
 
3. The Estimating Models of E-commerce 
Cooperation 
The electronic distributor E and the traditional dis-
tributor T possibly heading for the alliance. Intuitive-
ly, the reason of this alliance is adequate: On the one 
hand, from the interest of the traditional distributor T 
with resources of traditional channel, it has to maintain 
a low price of the commodity to compete with the 
electronic distributor which develops fast; Allying 
with electronic distributor can avoid such price war, at 
the same time make more practical interests. On the 
other hand, from the interest of the electronic distrib-
utor E which has advantage of electronic channel, it 
faces huge competing pressure from distributors of the 
same kind; however, allying with the traditional dis-
tributor can gain resources of particular products in 
competition, improving brand and scale of its own 
electronic channels, and a beneficial stance while 
competing with the distributors of the same kind. 
Now, we will analysis the detailed mechanisms 
formulating these two main reasons. 
① The willing and limits of alliance for the traditional 
distributor 
In the analysis above, the electronic distributor E 
and traditional distributor T, separately has stable 
market position in electronic and traditional sales 
market. Now we assume that there is another tradi-
tional distributor T1 beside T, and T1 and T have the 
E J TP P P 
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same resource advantage in traditional channel mar-
ket. The electronic distributor E frequently seeks op-
portunity allying with T or T1 for its motivation to 
develop. Besides, the electronic distributor E has 
access to purchase similarly reliable products provid-
ing by T or T1 in the market. 
Under these assumptions, there are three distrib-
utors taking part into the competing game in the 
market: the electronic distributor E, the traditional 
distributor T and T1. The electronic distributor E has a 
stable stance in electronic sales market; but the tradi-
tional distributor T and T1 will probably individually 
take half of the traditional sales market (if they are 
evenly matched). At this point, the traditional distrib-
utor T has several strategies to choose from as fol-
lowed: 
1） Do it alone 
The traditional distributor T explores market 
alone, the environment of competition it may face 
are: 
A. the traditional distributor T1 and the elec-
tronic distributor E each explore the market alone 
In this situation, the electronic distributor E oc-
cupies the electronic sales market, the traditional dis-
tributor T and T1 divide the traditional sales market 
equally. The electronic distributor E imports products 
alone (from upstream market), which may lead to 
high-priced cost. It may be expelled from the market 
by T or T1 using low price. So it is unbelievable 
threat. 
B. the electronic distributor E and traditional 
distributor T1 build strategic alliance J1
 
 
The cost that J1 (may assumed as a joint venture 
or franchise) sells particular products lies between E 
and T selling the same products. Seemingly T could 
use low-price to expel J1 from the electronic sales 
market. However, in fact, T1 and E, which are the 
parent companies of J1, can obtain profits and oppor-
tunity of expanding scale from cooperation. There-
fore, driven by the benefit of parent company, J1 has 
the possibility to exist. 
Concretely, Picture 3.1 could be used to describe 
the condition of J1.As it shows in Picture 3.1，the 
horizontal axis represents reliability of purchasing 
products, and the vertical axis shows the price and 
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cost, yet gets little increase on cost due to stable 
supply of goods when providing products through 
electronic market; The electronic distributor E has a 
comparatively low cost through electronic market, 
but it will has a surging cost if it sells new products 
which has no stable supply. In addition, consumers 
are divided into two parts: high risk aversion and low 
risk aversion. Ph curve in Picture 3.1 represents price 
curve of consumers who prefer to spend a higher cost 
(price) to get reliable guarantees; Pl curve is price 
curve of those who will pay less (lower prices) for 
equal reliability guarantees（Khai Sheang Lee，2007）. 
According to the theory of Dunning (J. H. Dun-
ning, 2001), it could save more transaction cost when 
transnational distributor increases the level of inter-
nalization. Hence, the cost that firms of alliance sale a 
certain product through traditional channel is higher 
than T, but lower than T when sale product through 
electronic channel due to the electronic distributor 
(here assumed that Along with the product purchase 
reliability reducing, the sales status of alliance tend-
ing to the electronic distributors’ sales situation).  
From Picture 3.1, relying on the cost advantage 
of highly internalization of individual proprietorship, 
the traditional distributor T can bring price down to 
(CJR -ε)(εis a small positive number), which could 
expel alliance J1 which was established by the elec-
tronic distributor E and the traditional distributor T1 
from E-sales market. But it will be revenged by E and 
T1. On the one hand, the traditional distributor T1 has 
the same cost curve as T, and it may merge J1 when 
necessarily, falling into a cannibalization price war 
against T. It is mire which T and T1 don’t want to fall 
into. On the other hand, facing price attack of T and 
being unable to gain benefit from alliance, the elec-
tronic distributor E would protect t E-sales market, 
use the low-price of (CF0 -ε) to compete for custom-
ers against T, and give active support to T1 to merge 
J1. Therefore, for a rational participator, it is unbe-
lievable threat that T provokes a cannibalization price 
war. On the contrary, on the condition of inexistence 
of a cannibalization price war, it is beneficial to all 
parties. 
There is a question remaining, why T1 want to 
ally with E, other than pursuing cost advantage of 
highly internalization of building individual proprie-
torship? We will leave the question to be settled in 
following text. 
2)  Ally with T1 
It will contribute to coordinate their behavior 
and avoid vicious competition when T and T1 make 
an alliance organization. However, according to the 
current partition of the market, T and T1 still share the 
traditional sales market.  
3)  Ally with the electronic distributor E 
Explanation to the question also settles the re-
maining question above, which is why T1 want to ally 
with E? 
To solve the question, Picture 3.2 is used to ana-
lyze market conditions. In Picture 3.1, the vertical 
axis represents price and cost, the horizontal axis 
represents performance of products. The difference 
between picture 3.2 and picture 3.1 is the meaning of 
the horizontal axis, the purpose of doing that is con-
venient to further divided the customers. 
As shown in the picture 3.2, when the coopera-
tion project has both market potential and profits 
space, on one hand, the potential customers are 
enough；on the other hand, the price curve (Ph and Pl) 
lies above the cost curve (CE，CJ，CT and CT1), we 
can subdivide the customers according to the interac-
tive relationship between distributors and the cus-
tomers. Table 3.2 shows four typical customer types. 
In table 3.1, type I customer would pay higher 
price for the pursuit of high purchasing efficiency, 
and its low risk aversion characteristics, making it 
does not pay attention to the reliability of the pur-
chase. Hence he is the relier of the traditional distrib-
utor that we discuss in this paper. The reason why he 
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buys products from joint venture or other forms al-
liance is his trust towards the traditional distributor. 
Type II customer also pursues high purchasing effi-
ciency，but they have high reliability requirement, in 
order to avoid the risk of purchase. Type III customer 
doesn’t pursue high purchasing efficiency, However, 
because of low risk aversion，the price has significant 
effects on his purchase behavior. He always expects 
to gain higher purchasing efficiency with lower price. 
Type IV also doesn’t pursue high purchasing effi-
ciency，but its high risk aversion characteristics, 
making it pay more attention to the reliability of the 
purchase. Hence he is the relier of the electronic dis-
tributor that we discuss in this paper. The reason why 
he buys products from joint venture or other forms 
alliance is his trust towards the electronic distributor. 
According to situation mentioned above, for 
type Ⅰ and type Ⅳ consumer are stable relier for 
traditional distributor and Electronic distributor ac-
cordingly, so, the competition between distributors, in 
essence is the pursuit of type Ⅱ and type Ⅲ pro-
ducer. In fact, the four types of consumer is barely 
one abstract of the real consumer and it can regarded 
as four types of typical representations of the real 
distributors, and the real distributors can be one type 
of them or the combination of any type of them. So, 
regarded the type Ⅱ and type Ⅲ consumers pursuit 
by distributors, we can imagine their characteristics to 
be very complicate. For instance, in "risk averse" de-
gree, there may have many states from high to low; in 
the reliability of purchase, may also have many states 
from high to low. In this way, we can use the follow-
ing method to analyses. 
 
 
Table 3.1 typical type of potential customers 
 Low risk aversion  High risk aversion 
High purchasing efficiency I II 
Low purchasing efficiency III IV 
In order to compare different situations, we first 
analyze the situation without alliance. Suppose there 
is a products which can be sold through traditional 
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Picture 3.2 classification of consumers 
CJ0 
CJPE
Purchase efficiency PE 
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that the consumers purchase products from T and T1 
are ，the probability of risk that the consumers 
purchase products from E is . Do not lose the gene-
rality, suppose =0, 0< <1；The loss of consumer is 
W. We suppose consumers’ preference of purchasing 
reliability distributed evenly in [0， ], if we suppose 
there is no difference between consumers’ purchase 
of products from T(T1) or E, and the preference of 
purchasing reliability of consumers is 
, , 
So,   
 (3.1)
We can explain the meaning of equation (3.1) as 
follows: on the left side of the equation is the pur-
chaser surplus decrease due to consumer purchase 
products through electronic channel( ) com-
pared to , however, we omit the pur-
chasing product price when
*ff  , on the right side 
of the equation is the purchaser surplus decrease 
caused by consumer purchase products through tradi-
tional channel（ ）rather than
*ff  , we 
omit the product price when purchase
*ff  as well. 
On base of equation (3.1), we conclude 
 
(3.2)
Obviously, if the consumer’s require of pur-
chasing reliability is
*ff  , the optional purchase 
object is the product sold by Tor T1. Suppose 
 is the maximum the probability of risk 
accepted by consumer, so , any consumer can only 
purchase products in the range of [0，fM], otherwise 
there is no corresponding consumer. Obviously, for 
consumer require the probability of risk is
Mfff 
*
, t the optional purchase object is the 
product sold by E. So, the question we researched is 
just a price question by Hotelling price game theory. 
According to that, we generalize the distribution 
proposition in equation (3.1),that is, consumer’s pre-
ference of purchasing reliability distributed evenly in 
range of［0，fM］, so , the profit of E is  
 
(3.3)
The total profit of the firm who sale products 
through traditional channel (including T and T1) are: 
(3.4)
Put equation (3.2) into equation (3.3) and equa-










Put equation (3.7) and (3.8) to equation (3.3) and 
(3.4) respectively, consolidate that with equation (3.2), 
we get the profits under equilibrium condition: 
(3.9)
(3.10)
So, under the proposition of evenly distributed 
the probability of risk of consumer, both profits of 
traditional distributor and electronic distributor are 
less than zero. Among them, equation(3.10)is the 
mutual profits of traditional distributor T and T 1 , 
due to the same situation of T and T 1 , any consumer 
make no difference purchase between T and T1 , thus, 
we can conclude the equilibrium profits of T equals to 
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  (3.11) 
In above analysis, equilibrium price equation 
(3.7) and (3.8) indentify, the higher the probability of 
risk of electronic distributor, the lower the equili-
brium price , and the higher equilibrium price of 
traditional distributor’s product. It is asserted keep 
other conditions unchanged, the higher the probabili-
ty of risk of electronic distributor, the more detri-
mental to electronic distributor’s market place keep-
ing, on the contrary, strengthen their counterparty’ s 
market position. This conclusion conforms to our 
intuition. In fact, from equilibrium profit equation 
(3.9) and (3.10) we can get the similar conclusion: the 
higher the probability of risk of electronic distributor
, the lower the profit
m
L , however, the competi-
tor’s (traditional distributor) profits
m
F becomes 
higher. Secondly, if market demand-based maximum 
probability of risk Mf  increases, all consumers 
benefit, it indicates market condition relaxing is 
beneficial to all manufacturer；Thirdly, consumers’ 
profits are negatively related to its costs, while posi-
tively related to competitor’s costs. 
Now, we study the situation that T and E estab-
lish an alliance. Here, we regard the alliance between 
T and E as an independent enterprise J; we conduct 
Hotelling price game theory analysis to J and T1. 
Thus, we deal with research questions with the same 
methods used above. Suppose the probability of risk 
of alliance enterprise J’s products satisfy following 
conditions: ,  is the 
probability of risk of T1, accordance with Hotelling 
price theory, the equilibrium product price of enter-
prise J is 
 
(3.12)
Equilibrium price of traditional distributor’s 





In the above two equations, CT1 is unit cost of 
product in T1, CJ is the unit cost of J’s product. We 
can see equation (3.12) and (3.13) respectively ana-
logous to equation (3.7) and (3.9).  The Nash equili-




In the above two equations,
m
J is alliance J’s 
profits, is traditional distributor T1’s profits, the 
structure as well analogous to equation (3.9) and 
(3.10). 
Now the question is: how electronic distributors 
E and traditional distributors T to allocate alliance 
profits
m
J . For convenience, here using "profitabili-
ty" as criteria (Guidelines of the "profitability" is one 
of the common assumption of the distribution of ben-
efits of the alliance, the actual principle of interests 
distribution of the alliance is often just close to these 
guidelines, or criteria; In addition, environmental 
change, organizational culture and characteristics of 
decision-makers will have an impact on the distribu-
tion of benefits) to divide the alliance gains (Farok J 
Contractor and Wonchan Ra, 2000). According to this 
rule, the share of the profits of one partners of al-
liance depends on the ratio of its own profit ability in 
total profit ability. Therefore, the profits that elec-
tronic distributors get from the alliance are: 
(3.16)
And the profits that traditional distributors get 
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The above two equations are determined by 
(3.11) and (3.9). 
In the above analysis, the profit value, such as 
equation (3.9), equation (3.10) (3.11) and (3.14) (3.15) 
and (3.16) and (3.17).Show that the profits not only 
related to the product failure rate of competitive par-
ties, but also more sensitive to differences of the cost; 
For example, the difference between CF and CL in 
equation (3.9) and the difference between CF1 and CJ 
in equation (3.14) have a greater impact on profits. 
Therefore, it can bring the cost advantage is the im-
portant factors to decide whether ally with each other 
or not. 
Above result of cooperative or uncooperative 
Hotelling price competition game between traditional 
distributors and electronic distributors indicate that，
there may be "win-win" alliance program which 
beneficial to both partners. 
 
4. Conclusion 
This study focused on EC cooperation strategy, trying 
to answer under what conditions the alliance between 
traditional distributors and electronic distributors can 
exist and how to achieve "win-win". 
Usually electronic distributors and traditional 
distributors can coexist in the same product sales 
market, but, electronic distributors lack of stable and 
reliable product source, they can only to take con-
sumer who have the low risk aversion as target cus-
tomers，while traditional distributors take the con-
sumer who have the high risk aversion to purchase 
the same kind of good products as target customers. 
Under the premise of the market segmentation, elec-
tronic distributors and traditional distributors make 
competition and cooperation in the E-sales market，
the traditional distributors who take advantage of re-
sources tend to choose to enter the market by means 
of ally with the electronic distributors. Traditional 
distributors enter into the electronic sales through 
cooperation with the traditional distributors; with rel-
atively low cost opened the electronic sales market. 
And electronic distributors ally with the traditional 
distributors, although the competition may aggravate, 
but really get a stable source of product, reduce the 
cost and improve the profit, and also may improve its 
original electronic sales network scale and brand ef-
fect. 
To analyze the specific mechanism of alliance 
cooperation, on the basis of Hotelling price competi-
tion game between traditional distributors and elec-
tronic distributors, we argue the cooperation strategy 
choice mechanism between electronic distributors 
and traditional distributors in the EC cooperation，
explore the benefits and costs of all parties in the al-
liance, found that it can bring more profit and cost 
advantage of the alliance is an important factor to 
decide whether or not ally with each other. 
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